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Abstract: The past three decades have witnessed a period of great turbulence 
in the economies of biological knowledge, during which there has been great 
uncertainty as to how and where boundaries could be drawn between public or 
private knowledge especially with regard to the explosive growth in biological 
databases and their related bioinformatic tools. This paper will focus on some 
of the key software tools developed in relation to bio-databases. It will argue 
that bioinformatic tools are particularly economically unstable, and that there is 
a continuing tension and competition between their public and private modes of 
production, appropriation, distribution, and use. The paper adopts an ‘instituted 
economic process’ approach, and in this paper will elaborate on processes of 
making knowledge public in the creation of ‘public goods’. The question is one 
of continuously creating and sustaining new institutions of the commons. We 
believe this is critical to an understanding of the division and interdependency 
between public and private economies of knowledge.
Keywords: Commons, instituted economic process, markets for knowledge, 
open-source software, public domain, public goods
1. Capitalism’s great divide
From the early 18th century, the earlier differentiation between public and private 
knowledge began to change and deepen into what we can now recognise as a 
great divide at the centre of the historical growth of knowledge and industrial 
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capitalism (David 2008). New institutional forms of public knowledge were being 
developed (encyclopaedias, public experimental demonstrations, development 
of shared mathematical languages across Europe) (Schaffer 1982; Shapin and 
Schaffer 1985; Golinski 1989, 1992; Stewart 1992). It could be argued that 
these were only tentative beginnings of the creation of a new ‘commons’ (David 
2001a). Seminal accounts that have highlighted the significance of scientific (and 
technological) knowledge for the major historical transformation of industrial 
capitalism, however, have seriously underplayed the emergence of the great 
divide and the new forms of both public and private economies of knowledge 
(Mokyr 2002; Landes 2003).1
During the 19th, and even more the 20th centuries, state investment in the 
production and reproduction of knowledge, through public education and public 
institutions of research, created an ever-expanding public domain of knowledge. 
These formed diverse public infrastructures of knowledge in new varieties of 
industrial capitalisms, even if the co-evolution of scientific and technological 
knowledge is recognised to be complex, involving feedback loops in both 
directions (Rosenberg 1992a, b; 1994). Public institutions of knowledge were at 
least as critical to the development of commercial, market capitalist activities as 
the infrastructures of health, law, or communications. It is difficult to conceive 
of continued industrial transformation without the growth of public economies 
of scientific and technological knowledge (Allen 2009). In retrospect, the new 
institutional forms of the public knowledge commons can be seen to initiate 
political economies that were multi-modal at their core, combining dynamic 
growth in many economic modes, not only the market. The characterisation of 
industrial capitalism as the historical beginnings of the commodification of all 
human activities, in which markets figure as the central institution (Nee and 
Swedberg 2005), is, in this perspective, one-sided. The dynamic growth of public 
domains, national and international, and especially of a ‘commons’ of scientific 
knowledge, has to be seen as a second, and far from subsidiary, motor of capitalist 
economic growth.
Yet, the emergence of new divisions between public and private domains of 
knowledge was, and continues to be, unstable and contested – evidence of a ‘fault 
line’ that runs through the history of industrial capitalisms. The boundaries are 
both shifting and “fuzzy”. At the extremes, the contrast between a public commons 
of knowledge (e.g. in a scientific journal) and private intellectual property rights 
(e.g. in a patent) can be quite sharp. But, as we shall show, there are many 
intermediate forms of ‘property rights’ over knowledge that blur any sharp lines 
of division. It could be argued that the legal establishment of private intellectual 
1
 Mokyr, for example, projected a view of early science, where handfuls of individuals, the scientific 
notables of the day responsible for creating a society’s ‘epistemic base’, onto the subsequent his-
tory of the industrial revolution. The growth and expansion of the public epistemic base, eventually 
universal education, and major secondary and higher educational and research institutions, hardly 
figure in this account.
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property was fraught precisely because such law also, by default, instituted what 
was not privately appropriable (Machlup and Penrose 1950; Kahn and Sokoloff 
2001). The developments of public and private domains of knowledge have been 
closely intertwined. One of the key moments of institutional change in US patent 
law in 1836 involved the establishment of a panel of experts as the first publicly 
recognised ‘jury’ that judged whether or not a claim to private property rights was 
worthy of a patent (Sokoloff 1988): a co-institution of public experts and new 
forms of private and public property rights.2 The emergent Patent Offices in many 
industrialising economies, and their subsequent developments from the mid-19th 
century, were janus-faced, even if the public face was on the shadow-side for 
the commercially-oriented gaze. Yet, it is ironic that somehow public institutions 
acquired much less public recognition, either in law or in economic theory.
2. The great divide and contemporary biological knowledge
This paper focuses on a new historical moment of instability at the fault-line 
of the great divide. In the late 20th century, biological knowledge underwent a 
revolutionary change in its epistemic practices and disciplinary characteristics 
(Cook-Deegan 1994; Zweiger 2000; Moody 2004; Harvey and McMeekin 
2007). Although much of the emphasis concerning this revolution has rightly 
been placed on the genomics, post-genomics and microbiology revolution, 
new technologies of experimentation, digitisation of images, and computer-
based in silico experimentation have extended this transformation across many 
biological domains. We argue that turbulence in knowledge is often accompanied 
by turbulence in the economic organisation of knowledge. The emergence of 
new knowledge forms, outside traditional and routinised practices of biological 
science and technology, presented challenges to existing economic institutions. 
Compared with the epistemic practices of the traditional ‘wet’ laboratory and 
the publication of a paper in the classic range of biological science journals, the 
landscape of biology and biotechnology has been transformed. In many domains, 
biology is now ‘big science’ and ‘big technology’, involving a step-change in 
funding, and new scales of international collaborative activity. A raft of new 
journals has emerged, redrawing boundaries and constructing new alliances with 
other disciplines: computing, engineering, physics, mathematics, to name but the 
most obvious.
The focus of this paper will be new forms of biological knowledge, and by 
this we mean especially the huge variety of bio-data deposited in bio-databases, 
and new forms of ‘soft’ scientific instrumentation, notably bioinformatic comput-
ing tools. By their nature, these new forms of knowledge and instrumentation 
broke with the established formats of hypothesis-testing experimentation. As we 
discuss in greater depth below, the separation of data production and deposition 
2
 Patent legislation itself may contain various requirements of disclosure, and in so doing differenti-
ates between dissemination and appropriation of knowledge, a point which we develop later.
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from journal publication constituted a change in how biological knowledge was 
organised. This organisational transformation of biological knowledge, we argue, 
was dynamically related to changes in its economic organisation, and unsettled 
the boundaries between public and private economies of knowledge.
Assumptions that an easy distinction between ‘basic’ science and use-oriented, 
applied science, can be mapped unproblematically onto an equally easy distinction 
between public and private knowledge, has long been challenged (Nelson 1959, 
1989, 2004, 2006; Stokes 1997). There is no clear or compelling economic or 
epistemic logic dividing basic science as public from technological knowledge 
as private and commercial. However, the turbulence in economies of knowledge 
that accompanied the revolution in biological knowledge was acute to the point 
where there was radical uncertainty as to whether vast swathes of biological 
knowledge would become privately appropriated for commercial use, or be 
established in the public domain. There were fears expressed that our biological 
heritage was at risk of being balkanised by competing commercial interests 
(Sulston and Ferry 2003) and counter-arguments that the advancement of 
biological knowledge could only be secured through market incentives and 
commercial investments (Venter 1998; Venter and Adams 1998).
Behaviours by major organisations, quite unpredictable from traditional 
assumptions, further de-stabilised existing economic organisation. The National 
Institute of Health (NIH), one of the largest funders of public science in the US, led 
the way in patenting genomic material in the early 1990s. A major pharmaceutical 
company, Merck, countered the NIH by rapidly depositing vast quantities of similar 
data into the public domain so undermining potential patenting, at considerable 
expense to its own balance sheet (Marshall 1999; Eisenberg 2000; Eisenberg and 
Nelson 2002). Many academics were fearful that, following the 1985 Bayh-Dole 
Act in the US encouraging patenting by universities, the public domain would be 
irreversibly eroded (Mowery and Sampat 2001; Mowery et al. 2001; Coriat and 
Orsi 2002; Mowery and Zeidonis 2002; Rai and Eisenberg 2003).
We focused our research on and around the fault-line, in order to better 
understand the dynamics of division and interdependence between public and 
private domains of knowledge. Many areas of knowledge, where historically 
the division lay at some distance in the past, remained undisturbed. We are not 
arguing that all biological knowledge was equally troubled, either epistemically 
or economically. At the fault-line, ex ante it was certainly unpredicted and 
unpredictable by any of the major players, where the divide would fall. Even now, 
from our analysis, it is clear that the boundary is contingent, and could well have 
been drawn otherwise. In the case of bioinformatic tools, the main focus of this 
paper, there is continuing uncertainty and instability, both for public and market 
forms. But what we want to stress above all is that we are examining ongoing 
processes of differentiation and interdependence. The question is not one of 
which or how many elements of new knowledge fit into old institutional divisions, 
private or public. The process of differentiation and interdependence creates new 
divides, and new institutions of both public and private knowledge. The novel 
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institutionalisation of public and private knowledge is at least as important as 
the other major finding of our research, namely that public domains of biological 
knowledge were resilient, innovative and expanding. For, far from retreating 
under the onslaught of commercialisation and the rise of new biotechnologies, the 
remarkable feature of recent history has been the emergence of new institutions, 
the public databases and open-source software. But in order to understand why 
this has been so, we were challenged to re-examine some of the very foundations 
of economic organisation, the nature of property in capitalism, indeed in the case 
of the public domain, when and whether it is appropriate to speak of public goods 
as public property.
3. Rethinking the commons
Many of the debates around the contested nature of the new biological knowledge 
have used the ancient term of the ‘commons’. Allusion has already been made 
to the way that the public domain, or the public good characteristics, of knowl-
edge – or indeed other areas of the ‘public’ economies of capitalism – have been 
under-characterized in social and economic theory, and underdeveloped in law. 
There has been a burgeoning sub-discipline and publications on intellectual 
property rights (IPR), almost exclusively directed at, and indeed often only 
indicating, private property rights. In this context, the public is often portrayed as 
the negative mirror image of the classic definitions of private property (Demsetz 
1967): the public is the absence of exclusivity, not divisible, or non-rivalrousness 
in use, and not under anyone’s control. Once produced, and available for copying, 
this is sometimes almost presented as an intrinsic property of knowledge, because 
of the alleged relatively low costs of copying, and lack of means of preventing 
copying once deposited or distributed in the public domain (Nelson 1959; Arrow 
1962; Dasgupta and David 1994).3
3
 There are several assumptions raised by this presentation of public knowledge as inherently dif-
ficult to privatise, following the famous metaphor of Jefferson’s flame (see Boyle 2008), which is 
replicated ‘costlessly’. Firstly, for the flame (knowledge) to be transferred from one taper (a knowl-
edge bearer) to another, a shared (epistemic) infrastructure with common properties that enable trans-
mission is assumed, supporting transmissibility. This is far from guaranteed, and is certainly not cost 
free. Secondly, the metaphor deals only with distribution, not with appropriation – being publicly 
distributed is not at all the same thing as being publicly appropriated as we shall demonstrate more 
fully. Public distribution is a necessary but not sufficient condition for public appropriation. Third-
ly, the continued burning of both flames (‘public’ sharing and maintaining knowledge over time) 
assumes an adequate common oxygen resource in order for copying not to be rivalrous (expenditure 
on education is not an infinite resource, and there are competing claims). Without unlimited resources 
of knowledge-sustaining ‘oxygen’, copying can deplete the original.  Fourthly, an assumption is made 
that all copies maintain their similitude and identity in the process of copying without diminishing the 
worth of the original. However, the integration of a copy into the transferee’s knowledge frames may 
typically lead to differentiations and novelties competitive with the original, so potentially reducing 
the original’s value. Such differentiation also opens the door to possible private appropriation. In 
short, these discussions seriously under-characterise the conditions that characterise and underpin 
the ‘public’ character of a public good.
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In a similar vein, the concept of the ‘commons’ with its connotations of 
unrestricted access to uncontrolled use by any and everyone is in effect only the 
negative image of private property, as defined by exclusivity and rights of control 
over use. Indeed, it is strange that a feudal institution has figured so large in the 
notion of contemporary concepts of public goods:4 in its origins, the commons 
were in fact owned by feudal lords, who devolved specific and limited rights 
of use to those circumscribed populations of the manor subordinated to them 
(Humphries 1990). The story of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is then told as a 
moral tale linked to assumed universality of selfish individual interest and the 
absence of private control: the pursuit of individual interest without collective 
regulation inevitably leads to overuse and exhaustion of the common resource. 
The story has then been further buttressed by the ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’, 
another morality tale which has been deployed to convey two alternative (not 
necessarily incompatible) morals: both multiple partial claims to use and unclear 
rights of exclusion lead to underuse, resulting in the worst of all worlds (Hardin 
1968, 1998; Heller 1998; Heller and Eisenberg 1998). The moral choice is either 
to restore the commons,5 or institute clear and unequivocal private property rights. 
David (2001b; also Lessig 2004) has effectively demonstrated the inadequacy 
of the concept of a commons when applied to knowledge, because knowledge 
is not a finite resource exhaustible by overuse. Knowledge grows and develops 
with use, especially when combined with collective examination and testing.6 Yet 
we are still left with a concept of commons defined by unrestricted access and 
non-exclusive use which is at bottom a negative rather than a positive account of 
the public character of scientific knowledge.
One of the aims of this paper and our book (Harvey and McMeekin 2007), 
therefore, is to develop a more adequate and multi-dimensional understanding 
of the public character of scientific and technical knowledge. The focus of the 
preceding discussion has intimated the need to distinguish between distribution 
and appropriation, and the necessity to include both in any adequate characteri-
sation. Even within a narrow perspective of ‘property’ and ownership, we believe 
that a positive account of public appropriation is required to differentiate between 
different kinds of public good (Kaul and Mendoza 2003). Consequently, we 
need to elaborate a concept adequate to the evolving and developing nature of 
public scientific and technical knowledge. Essentially, we shall argue that public 
appropriation means public control. New forms of public control regulate the 
4
 The classic trope of the commons is that it is an open, public and collective resource, threatened 
by the menace of private ownership and ‘enclosure’, whether in relation to land in historical times or 
knowledge and ‘the commons of the mind’ in contemporary societies (Boyce 2003, 2008).
5
 It should be remembered Heller’s first development of the anti-commons concept was in the con-
text of the transformation of socialist into market economies, with the thrust of the argument clearly 
in favour of clear individual private property rights.
6
 Interestingly, David here picks up on a notion of public knowledge in terms of collective pro-
duction, as against unrestricted access and unlimited use. This is a point our framework develops 
further.
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qualities, temporalities, representations and ontologies of knowledge, through 
a continuous and ongoing process of development of standards, testing, and 
enforcement procedures. In this paper, we aim to show that the institution of 
biodatabases, and specifically, the uses of bioinformatic tools, are at the centre of 
an evolving process of public control within key areas of biological science.
But we shall argue that there is much more to making knowledge public than 
public appropriation. The next section of the paper will summarise our broad 
analytical framework, necessary to encompass the multi-dimensionality of the 
public–private divide, and its historical and evolutionary character. We want to 
argue an apparently simple idea. A sharp division of labour between producers 
and users of knowledge opens up the possibility (no more) for stable patterns 
of distribution and exchange between them, and hence markets for knowledge 
and/or public domains of knowledge. Within capitalist political economies, 
markets for knowledge may indeed be established. But the growth of knowledge 
within collective communities of experts rests on an absence of divisions between 
producers and users of that knowledge for the production of further knowledge. 
So, there is an ongoing tension between establishing sharp divisions between 
producers and users, and ensuring the growth of knowledge through the productive 
and unrestricted flow of knowledge between producers and users within specific 
communities of experts. Hence, where markets for knowledge emerge, they remain 
dependent upon the growth of knowledge in the public domain. The instability of 
both private and public economies of knowledge for bioinformatic tools critically 
supports this argument by examining competing alternative experimentations in 
economic organisation, centrally focusing on conflicts around the emergent 
divisions between producers and users of bioinformatic tools.
Having set out our analytical framework, the empirical core of the paper 
then employs it in order to analyse major historical bioinformatic cases. We 
first explore the process of differentiation and interdependence between new 
forms of private and public knowledge in the early history of bioinformatic 
tools and biodata. Then we present case studies of two of the most significant 
bioinformatic tools of the 1990s, exemplifying rapidly shifting, unsettled 
and blurred boundaries. We then conclude by concentrating our focus on the 
‘instituting of the commons’, by arguing that public economies of knowledge 
entail the dynamic relations between collective production, forms of distribution, 
modes of control, and varieties of use. Appropriation – or property rights – can 
only be fully understood within this broader analytical framework of economies 
of knowledge.
4. The ‘instituted economic process’ (IEP) approach
One of the key features of the revolution in biological science has undoubtedly 
been the emergence of markets for knowledge. It has long been recognised that 
a society’s stock of knowledge, its ‘epistemic base’ (Mokyr 2002), is necessary 
for the production of all kinds of goods, many traded in markets. Markets for 
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knowledge – as distinct from labour markets for knowledge-bearers – entail the 
creation of knowledge entities that are themselves tradable. For biology, this was 
most evident as soon as data contained in biodatabases became a separate and 
novel form of biological knowledge, partly as a consequence of new technologies 
of data production, such as high-throughput sequencing.7 The emergence of new 
and distinct ‘economies of knowledge’, both public and private, present challenges 
to economic analysis, stretching and expanding our analytical frameworks. 
Knowledge is notoriously elusive as an object of socio-economic enquiry, and is 
ill-served when corralled into frameworks designed for understanding the more 
conventional ‘economies of products and services’.
The ‘instituted economic process’ (IEP) approach was developed out 
of an anthropological perspective on economies (Polanyi 1957a, b),8 that 
brought with it the advantage of neutrality with respect to market or non-
market, primitive, historical or contemporary, economies (Harvey et al. 2003; 
Harvey 2007; Harvey and McMeekin 2007). Presented here schematically, 
the approach posits economies as the combination of four transformational 
processes: transformations of qualitative characteristics, transformations 
of spatial location, transformations of functionality, and transformations of 
control. Taken separately, none of these four transformational processes are 
in themselves economic. Only when instituted in combination with each other 
do they become constitutive of economies, recognisable under the guise of 
respectively, production, distribution, use and appropriation. So when applied 
to economies of knowledge, the IEP approach involves the institution of 
processes of the qualitative transformation of knowledge (knowledge growth 
and accumulation); the distribution or dissemination of knowledge; the changes 
in use of knowledge; and the control of knowledge, formal and informal, 
legal and technical, by individuals, legal entities, collective communities, 
or wider societies. Economies are instituted insofar as they successfully 
reproduce themselves through historical combinations of these four processes. 
Again, in terms of knowledge, this involves the idea that social knowledge is 
produced, distributed, used and controlled within a society over a period of 
time. Historically, we know that there are no guarantees that an existing level 
of knowledge is maintained. Knowledge is also unequally distributed, used and 
controlled both within and between societies.
7
 Prior to this separation, data had more typically been presented along with experimental results 
from hypothesis testing, or as evidence supporting taxonomic categorisations, for example.
8
 Following The Great Transformation (Polanyi 1944), Polanyi developed a novel framework for 
understanding the variety of historical economies, especially with his concept of economies as in-
stituted process. For him, there were only two processes necessary to specify the formation of an 
economy, displacements in space and transfers of control. His failure to consider transformations of 
quality (“production”) or use (intermediate or end consumption), led him to give undue centrality 
to markets in contemporary economies, as the sites of both distribution and changes of ownership. 
Innovation in production and changes in consumption thus largely fall outside his analysis (Harvey 
and Metcalfe 2004).
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But over the past three centuries, we have witnessed the growth of the modern 
sciences, absorbing vastly expanding societal resources, and an ever-changing 
division and hierarchical differentiation of scientific activities: new disciplines, 
new organisations of research production and teaching reproduction, new modes 
of funding, and so on. The creation of specialist public institutions, alongside 
the formation of private, knowledge-intensive corporations, has been ever more 
evident in the historical development of capitalism. Some of these institutions, 
notably those of the sciences, have been internationalised or globalised. The 
databanks that now hold huge quantities of genomic data in the US, Europe and 
Japanese are contemporary examples of new global institutions of science, with 
global interchange and harmonisation of data.
When analysing the emergence of new public institutions and markets 
in biological knowledge from an IEP perspective, two particular theoretical 
developments proved useful. The significance of the differentiation between 
production and use, and associated divisions of labour, has already been 
mentioned. For example, the specialised producers of bioinformatic tools, and in 
particular the creators of software packages, enable users to avail themselves of 
technologies without necessarily understanding the workings of the algorithms 
within a computer programme. The first development is to distinguish between 
two axes of the four economic processes, production and use, on the one hand, 
distribution and appropriation on the other (Figure 1, below).
The articulation of economies by two axes reinforces the earlier theoretical 
point that the four processes only become economic when in combination. When 
a relatively stable differentiation between production and use arises, this leads 
to a socio-economic division between groups of producers and groups of users. 
But for this to occur and be sustained over time, complementary processes of 
knowledge distribution between the groups emerge, and along with that, processes 
Production Appropriation
Distribution Use(consumption)
Axis 1: differentiation between producers and users 
Axis 2: articulation between distribution and appropriation 
Figure 1: The two axes of instituted economic processes.
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appropriation develop, by and between groups and individuals. In short there is an 
axis of differentiation and a second of integration,9 which, if leading to continuous 
and sustainable reproduction, constitute ‘an economy’.
The division between production and use led to the second development, 
particularly significant in the production of knowledge: knowledge as an output 
can either be used for the further production of further similar knowledge or for 
dissimilar knowledge production, or finally for non-knowledge purposes. Thus, 
a bioinformatics tool can either be the basis of further developments of similar 
bioinformatic tools (modified, for example, to be included in an interoperable suite 
of tools), or by protein structure specialists and deployed in producing analysis 
of protein structure, or by pharmaceutical company scientists identifying possible 
drug targets. Many of the productive outputs are therefore polyvalent in use, and 
given this multiplicity of alternative uses, competing economies of knowledge 
emerge, depending on how these different uses are combined, separated, or 
restricted.
Within the IEP framework for analysing economies of knowledge, therefore, 
it is important to stress that there are no prior assumptions about how and where 
new divisions may develop between knowledge producers and users, how and in 
what manner the resultant knowledge is distributed amongst potential users, or 
appropriated, collectively, corporately, or individually. Whether, and over what time 
spans, new economies of knowledge may be instituted is an empirical matter, and so 
it is to the history of the development of bioinformatic tools that we now turn.
5. Early process of differentiation and integration within 
bioinformatics
In Public or Private Economies of Knowledge (Harvey and McMeekin 2007), we 
analysed the development of biodatabases, bioinformatic tools, and a microbial 
genome race (Agrobacterium tumefaciens). By restricting the focus of this 
paper to bioinformatic tools, we relegate to ‘pre-history’ a number of important 
developments, summarised here. Up to the 1990s, it would have been difficult 
to treat bio-databases separately from bioinformatic tools, and within the latter, 
the differentiation between algorithms and their operationalisation in computer 
programmes was quite underdeveloped. Many of the early bioinformatic software 
tools were distributed along with the databases, on tapes. Once internet access 
was developed for the main databases, the tools could be distributed separately 
from biodata, and in most cases they were, for both genomic and protein databases 
(Bairoch 2000). Secondly, in the early days of high-throughput sequencing, the 
manufacturers of the hardware, notably for the ABI Perkin-Elmer first generation 
9
 For Polanyi (1957a), how economic processes of distribution and appropriation of resources are 
organised within a society is critical to their integration. He distinguishes between three modes of 
integration, according to whether they are based on reciprocal obligation, hierarchical redistribution, 
or market exchange.
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sequence assemblers, attempted to embed the software with the hardware. The 
public science Human Genome Project resisted this ‘privatisation’ of what was 
considered to be critical scientific aspect of the nature and quality of data 
produced by the software. Hence, Staden and Sulston reverse engineered the 
software, creating their own sequence assembly bioinformatic tools, independent 
of commercial hardware, and supported within the public domain. This 
independence of bioinformatic tools from hard technology, therefore, was secured 
as a necessary guarantee for the scientific robustness and quality-testing of the data 
(Sulston and Ferry 2003, 93–4). However, if only to emphasise the contingency 
of securing a public economy of knowledge along with the independence of 
tools from machinery, an almost identical controversy has arisen with the second 
generation high-throughput genome sequencers (the 454, for example), and once 
more independent public software has been developed and for essential the same 
scientific rationale (O’Rourke 2006).
Thirdly, before the widespread use of computer programming and desktop 
computers, the algorithms that were to be the key workhorses in the new 
technologies of similarity searching were published in scientific journals, along 
completely accepted and normal routines and practices of the day: there were 
no thoughts or prospects of commercialisation. The path-breaking algorithms of 
Needleman and Wunsch (1970) and Smith and Waterman (1981) are cases 
in point. As these were developed to enhance and accelerate these techniques, 
the algorithms were incorporated into software programmes, notably FASTP 
(Lipman and Pearson 1985) and later BLAST (Altschul et al. 1990), publicly 
available on sites hosted by the main bio-databases. The biological significance 
of similarity searching for the understanding of biological function across species 
was recognised to be one of the major scientific gains of the period (Doolittle et 
al. 1983; Waterfield et al. 1983; Hodgman 2000). For our argument, perhaps the 
most significant implication of this development was that any restriction of access 
to biological data was a restriction on the scientific development of understanding 
biological function through similarity searching. Open access to, and integration 
across, biological databases carried a scientific imperative underpinning the need 
for biodatabases to be public domain, and global in scale. At this early stage, 
therefore, the public character of both major databases and bioinformatic tools 
was taken for granted: it was ‘carry on as usual’.
Ironically, however, as soon as the process of differentiation in epistemic 
practices became established, and ‘bioinformatics’ and bioinformatic tool 
production established themselves as distinct activities, the usual no longer 
appeared usual. Questions were raised as to whether these activities were truly 
‘scientific research’ worthy of public funding. Many of the early forms of 
databases and tools were instituted within quite novel ‘economies of knowledge’, 
maintaining themselves through licenses and charging both academics and 
commercial enterprises, if at different rates. There was open access, including 
to the source-codes of the software. But, because of the unwillingness of public 
funding bodies to support these activities, access was at a price. An exchange 
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was instituted in return for a right of access, while use was unrestricted for 
either public or private users. This destabilisation of the normalities of public 
economies of knowledge sets the scene for the two main empirical cases 
analysed below.
The resistance to publicly funded bioinformatic tools (and databases) is related 
to a fundamental question about the nature of these tools, as novel epistemic 
entities. In what ways are bioinformatic tools searching databases similar to or 
different from microscopes or telescopes searching the universe or a various 
microcosms? This relates to the question of whether there are distinct producers 
and users (the tool-makers, and the tool-users), and the related question of whether 
scientific tools are commercially produced (as have all PCR or high-throughput 
sequencers, for example) or publicly provided. As bioinformatic tools developed, 
and were operationalised in computer programmes, there were various groups of 
users increasingly no longer needing to understand how the algorithms worked, 
any more than a biologist using a microscope needs to understand advanced optics. 
Up to a certain point, therefore, bioinformatic tools seem similar to microscopes 
in the way the epistemic functions of tool-maker and tool-user are differentiated. 
However, as we have already seen with the Staden-Sanger sequence assembly 
software, there is also an important difference. Bioinformatic tools are deeply 
implicated in the construction of bio-data, the standardisation, quality control 
and rigour of the data, as well as underpinning the new ontologies of biological 
understanding. The development of the tools is continuous and interdependent 
with the development of new analytical and empirical scientific knowledge. So, 
while they are useful tools for some users, they are much more than that, and serve 
different epistemic functions at the core of a scientific research development for 
others. For the former, there is no need to understand how the tools work in order 
to use them; for the latter, tool development is central to the research activity, 
requiring access to, and understanding of, the inner workings of the tool. This 
polyvalence of use – maybe only a transitory phase but one that continues to the 
present – is, we believe, at the heart of the instability that persists in the economies 
of knowledge for bioinformatic tools.
Before leaving the discussion of the ‘pre-history’ of bioinformatic tools, how-
ever, this must be placed in the wider context. Although differentiated as epistemic 
entities, many bioinformatic tools are primarily dedicated to the analysis of bio-
databases. We cannot present the evidence or analysis here, but these biodatabases 
emerged as dynamic, growing, and novel institutions overwhelmingly in the public 
domain. A whole new range of databases at the National Centre for Biotechnology 
Information (NCBI), European Bioinformatics Institute and DNA Databank of 
Japan (DDBJ) constitute a dominant, hegemonic presence, whose existence now 
appears securely established. As a consequence, whatever the economic path of 
development of bioinformatic tools, they achieve their value, and prove their use, 
only in strict interdependence with the ongoing growth and expansion of public 
domain data. The big picture for many commercial developments of the biological 
sciences in pharmaceutical or agricultural corporations, is thus one of dependency 
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on a vibrant and expanding public domain. There could be no clearer evidence of 
multi-modal capitalist growth.
6. Contrasts and conflicts: two trajectories of bioinformatic  
tool development
Two of the major bioinformatic software tools of recent decades, the Sequence 
Retrieval System (SRS) incorporating GeneQuiz and the Wisconsin package 
or GCG, underwent quite dramatic, yet contrasting, historical developments, 
epistemically and economically. Both had similar origins. They emerged as spin-
outs from public science institutions, the European Molecular Biology Laboratory 
(EMBL) and the University of Wisconsin, respectively. But, situated on different 
continents and institutional settings, including financing arrangements, their 
subsequent pathways could scarcely be more contrasting. As we write, in one 
case, the software continues residually in the public domain after a long ex-
perimentation with hybrid private and public forms of the software. The story is 
a rollercoaster of commercial success and failure. In the other, privatisation and 
commercialisation provoked the emergence of a public alternative, so that we 
now witness almost equivalent private and public economies of knowledge, in 
potential or actual competition with each other. The contrast itself illustrates the 
possibility of different outcomes: there is nothing inherent or pre-established 
either about epistemic or economic organisation that led to these outcomes. But, 
it also supports our analysis that similar dynamic processes of differentiation and 
interdependence between producers and different users underpin both trajectories, 
and the consequent possibility of either market-commercial or public institutional 
economies of knowledge. This is the key purpose of our analysis of these two 
cases, namely, to offer an explanation of the contrasting trajectories.
The two contrasted trajectories are summarised – very schematically – below, 
with a particular emphasis on the articulation between the two IEP axes, production 
and use, distribution and appropriation.
6.1. GeneQuiz, BioScout and SRS10
The linked historical trajectories of a sequence analysis bioinformatic tool for 
automated annotation and the Sequence Retrieval System (SRS), both key 
technologies, are remarkable for their emergence out of a public economy of 
knowledge, a relatively brief but spectacular experimentation with commercial 
economies of knowledge, culminating in a return into the public domain, 
revived with a new and dynamic future. Both tools originated in EMBL, and, 
following their initial development in the mid-1990s, were considered to be 
technical instruments vitally useful for research, but no longer to be funded as 
10
 We are grateful to Reinhard Schneider, Georg Casari and Thure Etzold of Lion Bioscience, Peter 
Rice of Lion Bioscience and EBI, Iain Mattaj at EMBL and Janet Thornton, Director of the EBI for 
the interviews that informed this account.
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objects of scientific research. European Commission research policy, influenced 
by developments in the US, was also directed to stimulating commercialisation 
of academic achievements where appropriate. GeneQuiz was one of the new 
generation of tools designed to meet the challenge of the explosion of sequence 
data, by providing high quality, high speed, annotation (biological interpretation 
especially of functionality). Consequently, although GeneQuiz remained in use 
in the public domain, a spin-out firm was created, Lion Bioscience, which had 
a license to develop and commercialise the tool, particularly for the expanding 
commercial market of pharma- and agri-biotechnology (McMeekin et al. 2004). 
The commercial version, named BioScout, was developed within Lion under 
license to EMBL. Then in 2002 its source-code was deemed significantly 
different from GeneQuiz, as developed within the EBI. BioScout then became 
an independent software package, with protected source code, and an established 
market. In terms of our IEP analysis, one tool had divided into two: GeneQuiz 
remained a tool within academia where a community of experts had access to the 
source code, and developed it in conjunction with a community of users. The tool 
was an integral part of knowledge production, within a shared community. It was 
freely distributed to, and was under the control of, that community. BioScout, by 
contrast, established a clear division between the tool developers (internal and 
restricted to the company), and users, the market clients. Both market clients and 
the academic community were cut off from the source code, and Lion distributed 
the tool through market exchanges, and had full control of their intellectual 
property. The functionalities of the two versions had become differentiated, and, 
up to a point, enabled the institution of two distinct economies of knowledge 
around the tool, one private the other public.
However, there was a continuing instability at the fault line between public 
and private domains. GeneQuiz and BioScout had both been developed within 
the SRS technology platform, a tool that provided an homogenous interface to 
80 biological databanks at the time (Etzold et al. 1996). SRS was the dominant, 
indeed standard, bioinformatic technology for integrating a vast new and 
disparate data landscape. In a sense, SRS underpinned the integration of multiple 
databases into a single public space. For Lion Bioscience, this meant that their 
core business was constrained by its dependency on the SRS environment. At 
the time, moreover, there were considerable conflicts over funding SRS in the 
European Commission. So, as with GeneQuiz, a license was given to Lion 
BioScience to develop SRS and commercialise it. This time, however, no doubt 
because of its significance for integrating public domain data, the license set 
conditions that precluded separate development. Moreover, new software tools 
and applications, whether developed in the public or commercial sector, also 
required access to the SRS source code if they were to operate within the SRS 
data environment. There was to be a single SRS, but with polyvalent uses, 
serving both public and commercial users. This hybrid economy of knowledge 
was reflected in the strange arrangement that Lion’s CEO, Thure Etzold, 
retained a position at the EBI, straddling private and public organisations. SRS 
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was provided to commercial clients by Lion, while at the same time being freely 
available within the academic community.
For a while, this hybrid economy of knowledge proved viable, and for Lion, 
it was seen to provide considerable commercial leverage, because SRS secured 
a market position by being the gold standard for this tool functionality, acquiring 
an almost monopoly position. By the same token, BioScout also traded on this 
advantage. However, this hybrid economy also proved unstable, and eventually 
unsustainable. A commercial logic was pushing for SRS to become integrated 
into a commercial package of software, a ‘one-stop-shop’ for major clients. As a 
consequence, through a succession of acquisitions, Lion attempted to construct 
a bioinformatic platform including chemo- and medico-informatics, as well as 
integrative middleware, providing access to relational databases. This process of 
integration – never technically achieved – entailed major licensing agreements 
with Bayer and Nestlé, and for a time Lion appeared destined to become ‘king 
of the (market) jungle’, attracting investments of more than $100 million. As the 
market grew, and major clients were viewing the Lion platform as possibly central 
to their whole knowledge management, so too did the viability of a significant 
component of the platform remaining open-source and in the public domain appear 
less commercially interesting. At the same time, the academic community were 
becoming increasingly concerned that the increasingly market, drug development, 
adaptations of SRS would eventually lead to a fate similar to that of BioScout, or 
even that SRS would be entirely privatised. The integrated technology platform, 
incorporating SRS, was therefore becoming unsustainable from all sides. Within 
a short space of time, the SRS market imploded, and in 2006, Lion Bioscience’s 
bioinformatic business was sold for a mere $5 million.
But SRS survived and thrived, as did GeneQuiz. Brought back fully into the 
public domain within the EBI, it now has 31 registered public science institution 
servers, integrating public domain data across 1104 libraries. It has been 
progressively developed, undergoing many new and quite substantial revisions. 
In terms of our IEP analysis, the terms set for the commercialisation of SRS, 
in particular the retention of open access to its source codes, both prevented 
clear functional differentiation and separation of uses, and, by the same 
token, compromised its tradability in knowledge markets. Selling a knowledge 
management platform to corporate clients that had a key component remaining 
open-source, meant that neither the package nor the company were open to full 
private ownership or control. Straddling the fault-line between public and private 
proved unsustainable. Equally, however, it should be emphasised that market 
creation was undermined by the growth and dynamism of the public domain, and 
the advantages of a technology that integrated data across the world in a single 
epistemic space. SRS provides a public asset, an expanded commons, open to use 
by both scientific and commercial communities. But, although this might now 
seem the obvious outcome of the trajectory, it cannot be overemphasised enough 
that many of those involved at the time considered this to be the least likely end-
game. Moreover, our second example shows that there are indeed alternatives.
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6.2. Dividing and competing: GCG and EMBOSS11
The bioinformatic tool known as GCG from the Genetics Computer Group, or 
the Wisconsin package, from its host organisation the University of Wisconsin, 
was the pioneer suite of programmes for analysing nucleic acid sequence data. It 
was put in the public domain at the outset in one of the new journals in the field, 
Nucleic Acids Research (Devereux et al. 1984). It rapidly became a dominant 
bioinformatics tool, cited over 6000 times. Incorporating the Needleman and 
Wunsch, and Smith and Waterman algorithms, it created a unified computational 
environment, and was open source, allowing users to develop and customise it to 
their own purposes. In IEP terms, it was initially a producer-user/user-producer 
knowledge output. In the pre-internet period, as already mentioned, it was typical 
in that it was distributed on tapes along with data from Genbank. As one of the 
first examples of open-source software, however, it was also typical of the time 
in charging for distribution, ostensibly to cover costs, and at differential rates 
for commercial and academic users. Although copyrighted, if the user-producer 
modified it significantly (by 25%), the copyright lapsed, so providing an incentive 
to the scientific community to engage in its development.12
Quite early on, this public development or production process, through the 
open-source facility, was exemplified by the emergence in Europe of EGCG,13 
within EMBnet linked to EMBL, a European adaptation of the package. Import-
antly, EGCG was made available without charge on the EMBL network file server 
and ftp site. The main difference between the US and European versions was that 
it was distributed without technical support, and the GCG group distributed this 
version to all its subscribers. From an IEP standpoint, the interesting aspect of 
this complicated form of exchange is that it entailed a cost of distribution with no 
rights of appropriation – clearly demonstrating the importance of distinguishing 
between these two processes of making knowledge (or any other entity) public 
or private.
Partly because GCG was at least self-financing, and partly, no doubt because 
of the very different culture of the US public science, there were no serious internal 
pressures to commercialise the package, in the full market sense embracing both 
distribution and appropriation. But this economy of knowledge was de-stabilised 
from outside by a company trading in a competitor software package that had spun 
out of Stanford, namely, Intelligenetics (IG). GCG were considered to be engaging 
in unfair, state-subsidised, competition, distributing their product at a lower price 
11
 This account draws on interviews with John Devereux, ex-GCG, Scott Khan (Accelrys), Peter 
Rice and Alan Bleasby. We are grateful to them, and especially to John Devereux for providing us 
with correspondence and documentation related to the spinning out of GCG from the University of 
Wisconsin.
12
 It should be noted that these forms of property rights were quite ‘experimental’, untested by law, 
and preceded any formal conception, let alone legal status, of what later came to be known as “open 
source” software.
13
 The E of EGCG at first signified European, later Extended.
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than possible for a fully independent company. Law suits were threatened, and 
IG’s parent company, Amoco, a major funder and sponsor of the University of 
Wisconsin, likewise put pressure for IG to be given rights to distribute GCG at full 
market price, on pain of withdrawing all financial support to the University.
The GCG response, ultimately, was to spin-out themselves, and create an 
independent company. Initially, no change was made in the mode of distribution 
or control. During the early 1990s, however, rivalry with EGCG, now distributed 
widely without charge to non-GCG license holders (even though unusable without 
a GCG license), increased to a point where a decisive break was triggered. GCG 
Inc black-boxed the source code, the key form of appropriation for many software 
markets. As a consequence, the producer-user/user-producer feedback loop so 
critical for the early development of the tool was also broken decisively: from 
now on, any development of GCG would be behind the company firewall and the 
equivalent version of EGCG was abandoned.
From this decisive turning point, two major developments in economies of 
knowledge arose. GCG Inc, now with fully protected intellectual property rights 
over the bioinformatic software, themselves became targets for acquisition. The 
package was successively acquired first by Oxford Molecular, and then in 2001, 
by the newly formed Accelrys. One of the ironies of this process of business 
consolidation was that the firm that had triggered the spin out of GCG in the first 
place, Intelligenetics, had also been acquired by the same two companies. But 
the key development that occurred as a consequence of the black-boxing was 
a sharpening of the division between producers and users. Through the process 
of amalgamation, Accelrys was developing the one-stop-shop, comprehensive 
and integrated, bioinformatic platform, with increasing user-friendly interfaces, 
maximising the range of possible clients, and minimising their required bio-
informatic expertise. A bioinformatic tool was developed where indeed the users 
of the scientific equipment required little or no understanding of its inner work-
ings, any more than a user of Microsoft Word.
The second major development was the public response provoked by the black-
boxing. Now cut-off from a major scientific resource, where tool development 
was integral to further advances in biological science, the original user-producers 
of EGCG created a public equivalent, on an open-source, free distribution basis, 
EMBOSS, launched in 2000 (Rice et al. 2000). Significantly, with the experience 
of recent history behind it, the new software suite of programmes was protected 
under the General Public License (GPL), developed and administered at first by 
the Free Software Foundation. Effectively, the GPL and even the subsequent 
Lesser GPL, secures public rights over the software, impeding or restricting 
any subsequent appropriation and privatisation by private companies or other 
individuals and bodies. Although initially struggling to maintain itself through 
public funding, EMBOSS is now supported by the UK’s Biotechnology and 
Biological Science Research Council (BBSRC).
In this new, and reinforced public economy of knowledge, EMBOSS has now 
achieved full functional equivalence to the commercial GCG package, as evaluated 
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by the NCBI website. Moreover, as part of its expanded public funding, the soft-
ware has developed two formats, both supported by a helpdesk, one for the general 
user, whether public or private, the other for user-producers, bioinformaticians 
involved in the expert public contributing to the further development of the tool, 
customised and adapted to scientific knowledge production.
At this point in time, therefore, we can see that a clear process of differentiation 
of functionality has occurred. There are now two versions of the original software 
package, one private, embedded in a broad technology life-science technology 
platform, the other public, available to general users but critically also for user-
producers. Whether there is sufficient and stable differentiation of functionality 
remains an open question, and on that question rests the future of either 
version.14
To conclude the analysis of the GCG trajectory, we can return to our question 
raised as to whether a bioinformatic tool was similar or different from other types 
of scientific instrumentation, such as microscopes. The answer we can now give 
is that bioinformatic tools are relatively malleable: they can be crafted into tools 
like microscopes, where the user does not require knowledge of the workings 
of the tool; or they can be integral to further knowledge production processes in 
ways that not only require knowledge of the inner workings, but where such 
knowledge is necessary to analysis of the outputs of the instruments. This 
malleability makes it difficult to stabilise and secure functional differentiation 
into two different types of tool, and to eliminate their polyvalence of use. This 
epistemic characteristic is intimately bound up with the instabilities in economic 
organisation that we have analysed.
6.3. Comparing trajectories
To sum up this section, the two contrasting trajectories of SRS and GCG exemplify 
the analytical usefulness of the instituted economic process approach. The two 
axes of production and use, distribution and appropriation are articulated with 
each other in distinctive ways, with greater or lesser stability and durability. 
Some economies of knowledge became destabilised from within, almost as a 
consequence of their growth, as was the case with the early GCG package when 
resident within the University. Some were triggered by external pressures, notably 
the research funding climate in Europe and the initial resistance to understand and 
adapt to the novelty of digital, computer-based, biological science.
Both trajectories, each marked by transient economies of knowledge, reveal 
the dynamic connection between changing organisation of knowledge and 
14
 Interestingly, the unstable frontier between public and private forms of these software package 
has continued up to the moment of writing, with attempts by some GCG users to get the source code 
released into the public domain. Conversely, EMBOSS has defied the odds in successfully being de-
veloped by its supporters, with a new version just released. Ironically, it can be argued that EMBOSS 
presents commercial users with less of a risk to continued access and development than its private 
Accelrys rival. Peter Rice, personal communication, August 2009.
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changing economic organisation. Changes in the producer-user relationships, the 
processes of differentiation within scientific activity, entail changes in processes 
of integration, through the distribution and appropriation of knowledge. Many of 
the transient forms can be seen as experimentation in economic organisation – 
such as the two-tier, non-commercial pricing systems for distribution, for example, 
or the new forms of open-source, license-protected, public knowledge.
Above all, the creation of a divide between public and private domains appears 
as a dynamic and ongoing process, where new forms of economic organisation 
on both sides of the divide have emerged. Nonetheless, new divisions did occur, 
and the least sustainable economies are those that experimented with straddling 
that divide. Moreover, the resilience and dynamic of public domain development, 
even in the face of competition with private commercial forms, is clear even 
with respect to bioinformatic tools, where usual preconceptions might lead one 
to anticipate otherwise. The story is one of private growth being interdependent 
with growth in the public domain, one of the multi-modality of capitalist political 
economies.
7. Instituting the commons
The view of capitalist economies as one-sidedly market-led economies, locating 
the source of dynamism and growth in commercial enterprise (both a Marxist 
and Schumpeterian view), has, we argue, resulted in a undervaluation and lack of 
analysis of public, non-market, sources of dynamism and growth, most notably 
with respect to knowledge. We noted that ‘the public good’ or ‘the commons’ 
are characterised frequently as a default case or negative mirror image of private 
property: that which is non-exclusive, non-rivalrous in use, or inherently resistant 
to private appropriation.
Instituting the commons, we have shown, is a much more complex and 
positive process. In concluding this paper, we wish to draw together some of the 
central features of the ‘instituted commons’, first by considering them in terms of 
instituted economies of knowledge, and then, more narrowly, to draw attention 
to distinctive modes of public appropriation, those that make some knowledge a 
form ‘public property’.
Our analysis of the formation of public economies of a few but central bio-
informatic tools, notably BLAST, FASTP, SRS and EMBOSS, has demonstrated 
the importance of the articulation between four processes. Co-production by a 
community of experts was a major feature of all of these packages – and indeed 
of many others not discussed here. Open-source software led to a process of tool 
development, where new versions were generated, glitches resolved, and scope 
and scale of use of the tool expanded. Bioinformatic tools are not only developed 
through use, but also users become innovators, bringing about change in the 
tool construct. This then is one sense of public: production by a community of 
experts. If we were to broaden our focus, and explore the range of users and 
uses of bioinformatic tools, we could provide evidence of a notable expansion 
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in the scale of co-production of biological knowledge. To take but one example, 
a publication of a genome in a scientific paper entails a well-stocked toolbag 
of many bioinformatic software technologies, an extensive multi-disciplinary 
collaboration, and frequently, many different organisations, scattered across the 
world.15 The production and use of bioinformatic tools both by communities of 
user-producers, the bioinformatic experts, and by communities of users, within 
public biological sciences, has undoubtedly been expanding significantly over 
recent decades.
This expansion of both user-producers and users of tools for further knowledge 
production, however, is on its own an insufficient characterisation of an instituted 
commons. The possibility of creating an ongoing development requires also modes 
of distribution and appropriation, integrating the communities engaged in the 
process. Distribution by the World Wide Web, and the proliferation of networked 
PCs, has transformed access and availability of bioinformatic tools and data, 
along the general ITC revolution. However, we have seen that many early public 
software packages charged for distribution, both to academic and commercial 
users, as part of cost recovery. As with scientific journals, costed distribution, 
although unquestionably restricting access, does not in itself disqualify the 
distributed knowledge from the public domain. Only when distribution is linked 
to, made conditional upon, an exchange of restricted rights over use, or to the 
institution of public rights over use, does distribution become an issue of private 
or public.
For, open, unrestricted, possibly free distribution, does not of itself make 
what is distributed a public good (Benkler 2006). This is not only the case for 
newspapers distributed ‘free’ to customers (financed, of course, by advertising 
paid for indirectly by those customers). But the more critical contrast is with the 
personal blog site, where the content of the site is entirely under the control of 
the individual, but the distribution is completely free, and access is unrestricted. 
Or, yet more acutely, material is both illicitly and freely distributed on the web, it 
may both undermine private property and undermine public control, so becoming 
against the public good through exploitation of vulnerable people. So the final 
feature of the public economy of knowledge also involves modes of public 
appropriation. For the public commons of knowledge to be sustainable as an 
economy of knowledge, therefore, particular historical modes of instituting public 
production, use, distribution and appropriation emerge dynamically, as we have 
analysed in the foregoing section. The commons is an everchanging combination 
of these four processes.
A few remarks relating to public ‘ownership’ of knowledge are in order. A 
positive conception of control, one that stresses the development of positive gains 
from control rather than a risk-avoidance conception, underlies our notion of 
15
 In Harvey and McMeekin (2007), we stress that this kind of public co-production can also involve 
combinations between public science institutions and commercial companies, though often with the 
tensions characteristic of proximity of the divide between public and private knowledge economies.
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property, whether private or public. In considering public appropriation, the many 
modalities of control and their evolution are worth further exploration. Property, 
including most certainly public property, is a moving target. Here, three forms of 
public control, state-bureaucratic, formal legal, and expert community normative 
control, can be distinguished. Although frequently mentioned in the course 
of our analysis, the allocation of public resources to support co-production, even 
free distribution, are absolutely critical to the growth of the commons. Many of 
the funders of public research attach conditions to the allocation of resources 
to research projects for publication, use and dissemination. Broadly, this can 
be seen as the exertion of public control over public knowledge, underpinning 
co-production, distribution and use. In many countries, there has been experi-
mentation with new forms of conditionality: how and in what ways knowledge 
is disseminated, how and in what ways knowledge is made usable and by which 
communities of users. The example of EMBOSS was given, where a help-desk 
and a generalist interface was stipulated in the research funding. Indeed, Stokes 
has argued for the need for a continuing renewal of the social contract around the 
financing of public research (Stokes 1995).
Alongside state bureaucratic modes of appropriation, there have been tentative 
and relatively underdeveloped legal instruments for instituting public appropriation. 
We have noted the use of General Public Licenses to underpin and consolidate 
open-source software for the public domain, by restricting opportunities for 
subsequent commercialisation. Another example, supported by the National 
Institute of Health in the US, is that of the Genetic Association Information Network 
(GAIN) certificates, which formally prevent the patenting of published genomic 
data. However, it is notable just how underdeveloped, in legal terms, these forms 
of public appropriation are compared with patent and copyright law.
However, what is perhaps most striking about the recent period is the emergence 
of new forms of public control from within the scientific communities of experts, 
especially the control over quality, standards and norms. These have extended 
well beyond the traditional and entrenched norms of peer review as a means of 
controlling public content and distribution of knowledge. Moreover, bioinformatic 
tools have been at the heart of this developing and innovative institutionalisation 
of public control. One of the most startling, indeed controversial, examples of 
such community-based public control was the establishment of the Bermuda Rules 
for genomic data deposition (Bentley 1996).16 This required any but the smallest 
strings of sequence data to be deposited on public databanks by all research 
communities, within 24 h. This not only ensured the continuous expansion of 
public databases and the scope of similarity searching by bioinformatic tools, but 
restricted opportunities for private appropriation and patenting. It was seen as a 
necessary underpinning to ensure international collaboration between laboratories, 
a common standard of practice in making data public. This ‘institution’ of the 
16
 Cf. http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/research/bermuda.shtml for the Ber-
muda rules.
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commons, however, underwent significant changes over the next decade, with raw 
data being distinguished from finished or annotated data. Critically, Phil Green’s 
quality score measures (phred and phrap) became the bioinformatic tools that 
ensure standards of quality of data worldwide. For data to be public domain data, 
on a global scale, new norms and conceptions of quality were institutionalised.
We have already remarked on the significance of SRS as a tool for integrating 
otherwise discrete bio-databases into a single public data resource. There is a 
proliferating range of bioinformatic tools developing standards for harmonising 
the ‘ontologies’ of data in diverse databases. The Microarray Gene Expression 
Data Society and the Macromolecular Structure Database as part of the worldwide 
Protein DataBank (wwPDB) both exemplify this process. Communities of experts 
develop common standards by which all abide, as a supportive infrastructure 
for knowledge production. The Gene Ontology Consortium project is aimed at 
constructing shared metalanguages enabling integration of genomic knowledge, 
enrolling a wide range of genomics laboratories across the world (http://www.
geneontology.org/). Similarly, the Genomics Standards Consortium created a 
community of associates in 2005, laying down the minimum information 
standards for any deposition process incorporating data into public domain 
databases (http://gensc.org/gsc/). In this respect, a positive conception of control 
entails construction of shared constructs within which various communities agree 
to operate, as producers and users of biological knowledge. These examples 
demonstrate how the construction of norms for controlling the commons is an 
integral part of the scientific knowledge production, use and distribution process. 
As examples of ‘self-regulation’ within the public domain, they have shown 
continuing adaptation and evolution as the science itself develops.
In conclusion, instituting the commons is a complex, ongoing process, 
involving expanding societal resources supporting production, use, distribution 
and appropriation in ever novel ways. The commons is not a finite or fixed 
resource, to be used or exhausted, or a blank and given institutional space to be 
populated by public goods the attributes of which are universal or ahistorical. 
Alongside, and in dynamic tension with, the growth of private market and 
corporate organisations, the public commons has proved to be an evolving, 
innovative, institutional source of variation and experimentation. As such, it has 
been a primary motor of capitalist economic development.
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